Why Faith is Epistemologically Invalid
Note: I pointed a gentleman to the response regarding Catherine Elgin’s True Enough, and judging by his comments afterwards, it was clear he didn’t understand what was written. So here is the version that I’ve always used which is far more academically accessible. (I don’t have to appeal to Harvard level intelligencia for my rep. I just bust a ‘thought cap’ in a wigga’s ass.) It is stated in the first sentence. The rest is explanation.
Faith provides no means of determining a true from a false proposition; it is therefore epistemologically invalid.
Contrast this with, for example, observation, or the scientific method, correct reasoning or logic. All of these provide a method, albeit imperfect, for determining the truthfulness of a proposition. They are all defeasible, and thereby retain a commitment to truth.
Faith, on the other hand, not only lacks a method for determining the truthfulness of a proposition, but it also does not lend itself to “testable consequences.” Faith is thus indefeasible.
Defeasible – Capable of being annulled or invalidated.
Faith therefore cannot qualify as an avenue to knowledge. This is so because in Philosophy, (and Epistemology is a branch of philosophy), before a thing can qualify as “knowledge” it must first be true. And faith retains no method of making such a determination. It is therefore epistemologically invalid.